Over the past few decades, philosophy of science has developed a family of scientific realisms based on a roughly deflationary picture of truth. These are global but weak versions of scientific realism, versions that recognize the place of conventions, goals, and contingencies in scientific representations, while maintaining that those representations are typically true in a clear and literal sense. In this paper, I argue that deflationary realisms are unstable. While their starting points are good ones, deflationary approaches should help us to understand the sciences in simultaneously realist, instrumentalist, and constructivist terms.
Deflationary Metaphysics
引用:
《科技、醫療與社會》,第19期,頁233-252,2014年10月出版 期刊訊息
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